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ABSTRACT 
We find that the likelihood that a firm voluntarily provides an earnings forecast is sensitive 
to the extent to which other firms in the same geographic area provide earnings forecasts. 
We use instrumental variable techniques to alleviate the concern that these geographic peer 
effects are driven by omitted economic factors unique to a local area that lead firms to make 
similar disclosure decisions. Our findings imply that geographic peer effects in disclosure 
choices arise in part due to firms trying to avoid negative capital market effects induced by 
market pressure from local institutional investors. The evidence does not suggest that 
information sharing among firms plays a key role in generating these geographic peer effects. 
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1. Introduction 
A fundamental question in accounting research is: how do firms choose their voluntary 
disclosure policies? While the majority of work on this topic focuses on the influence of firm-
specific factors, a few studies show that the disclosure choices of firms in the same industry 
are also relevant (e.g., Houston et al., 2010; Tse and Tucker, 2010). However, there is no 
evidence that firms consider the disclosure choices of firms outside their industry, which is 
surprising given evidence showing that the actions of nearby businesses can affect a firm 
(e.g., Jaffe et al., 1993; Kedia and Rajgopal, 2009; Dougal et al., 2015). In this study, we 
attempt to fill this gap by examining whether a firm’s choice to provide an earnings forecast 
is sensitive to the forecast decisions of firms in the same geographic area (geographic peers, 
henceforth). 
The forecast choices of geographic peers could influence a firm’s forecast decision for 
two reasons. First, a firm could follow the disclosure behavior of geographic peers to avoid 
negative capital market effects. Investors, including institutional investors, have a strong 
preference for local stocks (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; Ivković and Weisbenner, 
2005). This preference leads to geographically-segmented capital markets in which investors 
make buying and selling decisions by comparing firms in the same area (Pirinsky and Wang, 
2010). Because earnings forecasts can provide information that allows investors to better 
analyze a firm’s return potential and use of capital, firms that provide earnings forecasts can 
experience capital market benefits resulting from reduced information asymmetries (e.g., 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Lambert et al., 2007). Thus, if investors consider and price 
the availability of earnings forecasts when comparing firms in a geographic area, we posit 
that a firm will have greater incentive to issue earnings forecasts when a larger fraction of 
its geographic peers forecast to avoid being penalized in capital markets.  
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Second, a firm’s decision to issue an earnings forecast could be sensitive to the forecast 
choices of nearby firms because a manager is more likely to observe these choices and interact 
with these peers. This explanation builds on work showing that geographic proximity 
facilitates information sharing among individuals and firms, resulting in the spread of 
similar behaviors (e.g., Hong et al., 2004, 2005; Kedia and Rajgopal, 2009; Dougal et al., 
2015). We conjecture that a manager is not only more likely to observe the disclosure choices 
of geographic peers but also can gain insight into the process and potential payoffs of 
forecasting through direct communication with managers in the local area. 
To test whether the earnings forecast behavior of geographic peers affects a firm’s 
disclosure decisions, we begin by classifying each firm by geographic location and industry to 
identify geographic and industry peer sets. We use the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) 
of a firm’s headquarters to identify its geographic location and assign the firm to one of nine 
industry SIC code divisions. For a given firm in our sample, we partition all other firms into 
one of two groups: i) firms operating in the same MSA but in a different industry (geographic 
peers), and ii) firms operating in the same industry (industry peers). These partitions allow 
us to separate geographic peer effects from industry peer effects. We then regress a variable 
indicating whether a firm provides at least one earnings forecast in a fiscal year on a variable 
capturing the fraction of firms in the same MSA but in a different industry that provided 
earnings forecasts in the prior year. In addition to controlling for industry peer effects, we 
also control for a number of firm-level factors that have been shown to predict forecast 
behavior as well as local per capita income, growth in per capita income, year fixed effects, 
MSA fixed effects, and firm fixed effects. Importantly, by including firm and MSA fixed 
effects, we control for any time-invariant firm- and location-level factors and therefore focus 
on time-series determinants of forecast decisions. Thus, our results cannot be explained by 
static geographic attributes, such as distance to major financial centers. 
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Overall, we find that a firm’s earnings forecast decision is sensitive to the disclosure 
decisions of firms headquartered in the same MSA but in a different industry. A one standard 
deviation increase in the fraction of geographic peers providing an earnings forecast is 
associated with a 1.8 to 2.0 percentage point increase in the likelihood that a firm issues a 
forecast. Given that firms in our sample provide an earnings forecast in 43% of firm-years, 
these values represent increases relative to the mean of 4.2% to 4.7%.  
While we interpret our results as evidence that firms consider the forecast choices of 
geographic peers when deciding whether to forecast, this sensitivity could instead reflect 
firms independently responding to time-varying shocks in the region (Manski, 1993). For 
example, firms in the same MSA could be exposed to the same extreme weather events, local 
elections, and changes in municipal tax rates. If these regional shocks drive firms in an area 
to make the same disclosure decisions, we cannot interpret the observed similarity in the 
disclosure choices of geographic peers as a true peer effect. To address this concern, we 
implement instrumental variable regressions using instruments based on prior work on peer 
effects (Leary and Roberts, 2014; Dougal et al., 2015; Parsons et al., 2016; Popadak, 2017). 
Our first instrument uses the expected likelihood that geographic peers will forecast, 
where these expectations are derived for each firm using the average fraction of firms in their 
industry but in different MSAs that provide forecasts. This instrument should meet the 
relevance condition because there is a strong industry-specific component to forecast 
decisions (e.g., Brown et al., 2006; Tse and Tucker, 2010; Allee et al., 2015).  The exclusion 
restriction is that the disclosure decisions of firms outside a firm’s industry and MSA should 
only influence the firm’s disclosure choice through the disclosure decisions of geographic 
peers. We believe this is a reasonable assumption given the lack of obvious commonalities 
between a firm and those firms outside its geographic area and industry.  
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Our second instrument is the average idiosyncratic stock return volatility of 
geographic peers. This instrument should meet the relevance condition because firms with 
higher risk, including higher stock return volatility, are significantly less likely to issue an 
earnings forecast (e.g., Nagar et al., 2003). Further, because idiosyncratic risk is 
unpredictable and unique to an individual firm, other firms’ idiosyncratic risk should not be 
directly linked to a manager’s own forecast decision. Rather, other firms’ idiosyncratic risk 
works via the impact on peers’ forecast decisions, and therefore, this instrument should also 
meet the exclusion restriction. We use the two instruments separately as well as together, 
and in all cases, continue to find a positive relation between the fraction of geographic peers 
that forecast and the likelihood that a firm forecasts.  
Next, we try to disentangle the channels that could give rise to geographic peer effects 
in forecast decisions. As mentioned, geographic peer effects could arise through two non-
mutually exclusive channels. The first channel is that firms will follow the disclosure 
decisions of their geographic peers to avoid capital market penalties. One prediction of this 
channel is that, if investors value the availability of earnings forecasts when comparing firms 
in their local area, then a firm’s costs of non-disclosure will increase when there is a larger 
base of local investors and a greater fraction of geographic peers that forecast. Thus, we 
expect that a firm will be more likely to follow the disclosure policies of geographic peers 
when it is exposed to a larger base of local investors. We build on prior literature that 
documents institutional owners’ preferences for voluntary disclosures (e.g., Healy et al., 1999; 
Ajinkya et al., 2005) to test this prediction and capture a firm’s exposure to local investors 
using institutional investors located in its MSA. We find evidence consistent with the 
prediction that firms are significantly more likely to follow the disclosure decisions of 
geographic peers when they have a larger base of local institutional investors. 
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A broader prediction of this channel is that, due to investors valuing earnings 
forecasts when making investment decisions, a firm will experience relatively lower demand 
for its stock and lower liquidity if it does not forecast and a greater fraction of its geographic 
peers forecast. To test this prediction, we capture a firm’s stock liquidity using bid-ask 
spreads, dollar trading volume, share turnover, and the illiquidity measure from Amihud 
(2002). We find that firms that do not forecast face higher illiquidity when a larger fraction 
of their geographic peers forecast, but these negative capital market effects are lessened 
when the firm also forecasts. Together with the prior results, these findings suggest that 
geographic peer effects in earnings forecasts arise in part due to firms trying to avoid negative 
capital market effects induced by market pressure from local institutional investors. 
The second channel is that a manager will observe and learn from the disclosure 
choices of firms in the same geographic area. To test for this channel, we follow Karlsson and 
Manduchi (2001) and Core et al. (2016) and use a measure that captures the density of firms 
in a geographic area. We expect that both a larger number of firms in an area and shorter 
distances among these firms will increase the visibility of firm decisions and facilitate 
interactions among managers. However, our results do not support this channel. Specifically, 
the positive relation between a firm’s disclosure choice and the fraction of geographic peers 
that forecast does not vary with the density of firms in the area. 
A possible alternative explanation for our findings is that, instead of firms responding 
to the forecasting decisions of their geographic peers, firms and their geographic peers share 
managers, board members, analysts, or institutional investors who have a preference for a 
disclosure policy, which leads to common decisions (Jung, 2013; Cai et al., 2014). However, 
our findings are not consistent with this explanation. After excluding geographic peers that 
have common managers, board members, analysts, or institutional investors with a firm, we 
continue to find geographic peer effects in firms’ forecast decisions.  
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Finally, we conduct a number of robustness tests. For example, given the importance 
of classifying firms as non-industry local peers and industry peers, we show that our results 
are not sensitive to the choice of industry definition. Specifically, we find similar results when 
we use the 10-K text-based industry measure developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016), 
two-digit SIC codes, and various Fama-French industry classifications. We also exclude the 
largest geographic areas from our analysis to ensure that our results are not driven by a few 
prominent regions. Further, our findings are similar if we: i) use the number of times a firm 
issues an earnings forecast during a year as our dependent variable (instead of our forecast 
indicator variable), and ii) control for the firm’s forecast decision in the prior year. 
Our paper makes three primary contributions. First, we extend research that 
examines the determinants of voluntary disclosures. Prior work documents that managers 
weigh a number of expected costs and benefits when choosing to provide an earnings forecast, 
including costs related to product market effects and legal or regulatory actions as well as 
benefits from the potential to reduce information asymmetries (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983; 
Trueman, 1997; Verrecchia, 2001). Information transfers and interactions between firms in 
an industry also influence disclosure decisions (e.g., Brown et al., 2006; Houston et al., 2010; 
Tse and Tucker, 2010; Allee et al., 2015; Baginski and Hinson, 2016; Seo, 2016). We build on 
this literature by showing that the earnings forecast choices of firms in the same geographic 
area can also affect a firm’s propensity to issue an earnings forecast.  
Second, we contribute to literature that investigates the significance of peer effects on 
firm policies, such as capital structure choices, stock splits, and dividend policies (Leary and 
Roberts, 2014; Kaustia and Rantala, 2015; Popadak, 2017). Prior work also shows that firms 
in the same geographic area exhibit similar patterns in behavior, arguing that these patterns 
arise due to local information networks and the spread of social norms (Kedia and Rajgopal, 
2009; Dougal et al., 2015; Core et al., 2016; Parsons et al., 2016). While we explore how 
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information sharing among firms in a geographic area might explain similarities in forecast 
policies, our evidence highlights the influence of geographic peer disclosures via a capital 
markets channel.  
Last, we add to studies documenting the ability of local investors to influence firm 
policies. Consistent with the notion that proximity to a firm lowers costs of communication 
and provides more opportunities for interaction with the firm, greater local ownership is 
associated with increased monitoring and improved corporate governance (e.g., Gaspar and 
Massa, 2007; Ayers et al., 2011; Chhaochharia et al., 2012). Our study complements this work 
by highlighting the ability of local investors to influence a firm’s forecast choice.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our main 
hypothesis. Section 3 describes our empirical methodology and data. Section 4 presents our 
main empirical findings. Section 5 discusses additional robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
Accounting information plays a critical role in market-based economies in which firms 
compete for funds. As outside parties, capital providers value information that allows for 
improved: i) analysis of the potential return on an investment in a firm, and ii) monitoring of 
a firm’s use of capital (Beyer et al., 2010). Importantly, if information released in voluntary 
disclosures lowers the risk investors assign to a firm, potential payoffs to the firm include 
greater interest from investors and financial intermediaries and lower costs of external 
financing (e.g., Lambert et al., 2007). Thus, factors such as investor demand for information 
and the opportunity to reduce information asymmetries are central to a manager’s choice to 
disclose more information than required by market regulations (e.g., Diamond, 1985; 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991).  
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In this paper, we hypothesize that a firm’s forecast decision will be sensitive to the 
forecast choices of geographic peers for two reasons. First, because investors have strong 
preferences for local stocks, a firm likely has a significant subset of investors who compare 
the firm to its geographic peers. If a greater fraction of these peers issue forecasts, a firm will 
have more incentive to issue earnings forecasts to provide investors similar information and 
mitigate capital market penalties associated with relatively higher information asymmetries.  
 Second, greater visibility and opportunities for interactions within a geographic area 
can facilitate information sharing between neighboring firms. A manager could be more likely 
to observe and/or acquire information about a nearby firm’s decisions because of local media 
coverage or through interactions with common parties. These interactions can facilitate 
similarities in firm policies, such as rank-and-file employee compensation, investment 
expenditures, and accrual levels (Kedia and Rajgopal, 2009; Dougal et al., 2015; Core et al., 
2016). Because every public firm makes the choice to issue an earnings forecast, a manager’s 
decision to forecast could be disproportionately affected by observing geographic peers’ 
forecast choices to the extent that these choices inform the manager about the forecasting 
process and potential payoffs. For example, a manager can observe how investors interpret 
and react to other firms’ disclosures or their absence and gain insight into the time and effort 
required to collect and analyze information through informal communications with other 
managers. 
3. Empirical Methodology and Sample Selection 
3.1. General Empirical Methodology 
 Each observation in our sample represents a firm j in time t that is defined by its 
headquarters MSA and industry. For a given firm j in time t, we partition all other firms into 
one of two groups: i) firms operating in the same MSA but in a different industry, and ii) 
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firms operating in the same industry. These partitions allow us to separate geographic peer 
effects from industry peer effects. 
To test whether the earnings forecast behavior of geographic peers affects a firm’s 
propensity to issue an earnings forecast, we estimate the following linear probability model: 
,
, ,
Non Ind Local Ind
j t t t t j m j tForecast α Forecast β Forecast Xβ υ ω τ ε1 1 1 1 , (1) 
where ,j tForecast  is an indicator variable that is set to one if firm j issues at least one earnings 
forecast during fiscal year t and zero otherwise.1 ,Non Ind Local
t
Forecast
1
 is our variable of interest 
and equals the fraction of firms (excluding firm j) headquartered in the same MSA but in a 
different industry that provided at least one earnings forecast in the prior fiscal year. We use 
lagged measures to ensure that peers’ forecast decisions are visible to the firm before the firm 
makes its own disclosure decision. If a firm’s disclosure decision is sensitive to the disclosure 
decisions of its geographic peers, α1 will be positive. We control for potential industry peer 
effects by controlling for the fraction of firms (excluding firm j) in the same industry that 
provided at least one earnings forecast in the prior fiscal year ( )Ind
t
Forecast
1
.  
 X is a set of firm- and MSA-level control variables. The firm-level control variables 
account for a number of firm-specific factors that have been commonly shown to influence a 
firm’s expected costs and benefits of disclosure and predict forecast behavior, including size, 
performance, uncertainty, the demand for information, and proprietary costs (e.g., Waymire, 
1985; Ajinkya et al., 2005). Therefore, we control for the market value of equity, if a firm 
reports a loss for the year, earnings and stock return volatility, analyst coverage, institutional 
ownership, the book-to-market ratio, and industry concentration. The MSA-level control 
                                                          
1 While the dependent variable Forecast is dichotomous, we estimate linear probability models instead of a 
conditional logistic regressions to avoid the incidental parameters problem and interpretation concerns in 
regressions with interaction terms. We discuss these concerns in detail and conduct additional robustness tests 
in Section 5.3. 
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variables include per capita labor income, the percentage change in per capita labor income, 
and the number of firms headquartered in an MSA, which account for a number of economic 
factors that may be spuriously correlated with the likelihood that a firm and its geographic 
peers provide earnings forecasts. We also include firm fixed effects (ωj), MSA fixed effects 
(τm), and year fixed effects (νt). Importantly, by including firm and MSA fixed effects, we 
control for any time-invariant firm- and location-level factors (e.g., distance to major financial 
centers) and therefore focus on time-series determinants of forecast decisions. The year fixed 
effects account for nation-wide factors, such as country-wide regulations (e.g., Regulation 
Fair Disclosure) that could affect the likelihood that a firm and its geographic peers provide 
earnings forecasts. Finally, to correct for heteroskedasticity and correlation of standard 
errors within firms, we cluster standard errors at the firm level. 
Continuous variables, except MSA-level economic variables, are winsorized at their 
1st and 99th percentiles, and all dollar values are expressed in 2015 dollars. Table 1 presents 
detailed definitions and summary statistics for all variables. In our regressions, we 
standardize all continuous variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one 
to ease the interpretation of coefficient estimates. In our sample, firms provide at least one 
earnings forecast in 43% of firm-years. 
3.2. Sample Selection 
We begin by using the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) to identify all 
public companies that have at least one analyst providing an annual earnings forecast during 
a fiscal year for the 1998 to 2015 period.2 We also obtain from IBES annual and quarterly 
                                                          
2 Although we use IBES and not First Call’s CIG database to acquire management forecast data, we take two 
measures following guidance in Chuk et al. (2013) to minimize the chance that we misclassify a firm’s forecast 
choice due to incomplete database coverage. Specifically, we: i) collect forecast data beginning in 1998, and ii) 
require that every firm in our sample have analyst coverage.  
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management forecasts to identify whether a firm issues an earnings forecast for a given year.3 
Because we require data from the prior year, our panel data set for our regressions covers 
the years 1999 to 2015.  
We classify each firm by geographic location and industry to identify geographic and 
industry peer sets. We identify a firm’s geographic location based on the MSA of its 
headquarters location.4 As defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an MSA 
is “an area containing a large population nucleus and adjacent communities that have a high 
degree of integration with that nucleus.”5 Using WRDS SEC Analytics Suite, we acquire the 
zip code of each firm’s historical headquarters location and match this zip code to its 
corresponding MSA. 
To identify a firm’s industry, we assign firms to one of nine SIC code divisions: 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing (0100-0999); Mining (1000-1499); Construction (1500-
1799); Manufacturing (2000-3999); Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and 
Sanitary Service (4000-4999); Wholesale Trade (5000-5199); Retail Trade (5200-5999); 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (6000-6799); and Services (7000-8999). We choose a 
relatively broader classification to identify a firm’s industry to minimize the chance that our 
geographic peer comparisons are capturing notable industry linkages. However, Section 5.1 
shows that our main results hold to using alternative industry classifications. 
Last, for our IBES sample with geographic and industry information, we obtain 
financial statement data from the Compustat annual files, stock return data from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) files, institutional ownership data from Thomson-
                                                          
3 We exclude forecasts announced after a firm’s fiscal year-end, as such forecasts often serve as preliminary 
earnings announcements (e.g., Rogers and Stocken, 2005). 
4 This choice is consistent with prior literature (see Pirinsky and Wang (2010) for a survey), which recognizes that 
executives manage a firm from its headquarters location. Further, literature also documents that executives 
exercise primary responsibility for a firm’s voluntary disclosure practices (e.g., Brochet et al., 2011). 
5 See “2010 OMB Standards for Delineating Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas”, June 28, 2010. 
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Reuters 13F Data Feed, and MSA-level economic variables from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. This merged sample used to create our measures of geographic and industry peer 
effects described in the next section has 54,405 firm-year observations. Our final sample used 
in our regressions consists of 40,771 firm-year observations.  This reduction in sample size is 
due to two reasons. First, to ensure that our peer effect portfolios are reasonably diversified 
and mitigate the chance that we amplify the influence of a few peers, we require that each 
sample firm’s geographic and industry peer portfolios consist of at least ten firms. This 
criteria results in deleting 9,047 observations. Second, we require non-missing values for our 
variables of interest, resulting in further deleting 4,587 observations.  
Our final sample contains firms headquartered in 68 different MSAs. Table 2 
tabulates the mean number of non-industry local firms in each geographic peer effect 
portfolio. On average, each portfolio is calculated based on the forecast behavior of 94 firms. 
Table 2 also shows that the number of non-industry local firms used to calculate the 
geographic peer effect portfolios varies over time.6 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Geographic Peer Effects in Management Earnings Forecasts 
We begin our empirical analysis by examining whether a firm’s propensity to issue an 
earnings forecast is associated with the forecast behavior of its geographic peers. Table 3 
presents the results of this analysis. The dependent variable in models 1-4 is an indicator 
variable that is set to one if a firm issues at least one earnings forecast during a fiscal year 
and zero otherwise.  
Model 1 reports the results from a regression model that includes our variable of 
                                                          
6 We are unable to calculate the standard deviation of the number of non-industry local firms in the geographic 
peer portfolio for the MSA Lafayette, LA because there is only one firm-year observation for this MSA in our 
sample. Excluding this MSA from our analysis has no effect on our results. 
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interest capturing the fraction of local peers outside a firm’s industry that forecasted in the 
prior year, controls for the fraction of industry peers that forecasted in the prior year, and 
year fixed effects (but not firm and MSA fixed effects). The results show a positive and 
statistically significant relation between the prior year forecast behavior of geographic peers 
and the likelihood that a firm issues an earnings forecast in the current year. Specifically, 
the coefficient estimate of 0.027 implies that, for firms with a one standard deviation higher 
fraction of geographic peers issuing an earnings forecast during year t-1, these firms’ 
propensity to issue an earnings forecast in year t is 2.7 percentage points higher. In our 
sample, firms issue an earnings forecast in 43.0% of firm years. Thus, an increase in the 
propensity to issue a forecast of 2.7 percentage points represents a relative increase in the 
likelihood of forecasting of 6.3% (=0.027/0.430). Consistent with prior work (e.g., Brown et 
al., 2006; Seo, 2016), the results also show that a firm is more likely to issue an earnings 
forecast when a greater fraction of its industry peers forecasted in the prior year.  
Model 2 adds controls for firm characteristics and MSA-level economic variables. 
Including the full set of control variables slightly lowers the statistical significance and 
economic effect of geographic peers’ forecast behavior on a firm’s propensity to issue an 
earnings forecast. Specifically, in model 2, firms with a one standard deviation higher fraction 
of geographic peers providing an earnings forecast is associated with a 2.0 percentage point 
greater likelihood that a firm issues a forecast (an increase of 4.7% relative to the sample 
mean fraction of forecasting firms).  
We note that the coefficient estimates on the control variables are consistent with 
previous findings. For instance, the likelihood of issuing an earnings forecast is positively 
related to firm size, the number of analysts following the firm, and institutional ownership. 
The likelihood of providing an earnings forecast is also negatively related to the occurrence 
of a loss and the volatility of the firm’s earnings and stock returns. 
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In models 3 and 4, we estimate our preferred regression specifications that focus on 
time-series variation in the relation between the disclosure decisions of geographic peers and 
a firm’s forecast decision. Specifically, we repeat the analysis in models 1 and 2 but add 
controls for MSA and firm fixed effects. Consistent with the results from the first two models, 
we continue to find a positive and statistically significant relation between the forecast 
decisions of geographic peers and a firm’s forecast choice. In terms of economic significance, 
the results in model 3 (4) imply that a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of 
geographic peers providing an earnings forecast is associated with a 2.0 (1.8) percentage point 
increase in the likelihood that a firm issues a forecast (an increase of 4.7% (4.2%) relative to 
the sample mean fraction of forecasting firms). In sum, the results in Table 3 are consistent 
with the hypothesis that a firm’s choice to issue an earnings forecast is sensitive to the 
forecasting behavior of its geographic peers.  
4.2. Shared Exposure to Common Shocks 
 We recognize that firms in a geographic area share the same local environment, which 
can facilitate exposure to common shocks that could independently drive firms to make the 
same forecast choices. Thus, in this section, we address the explanation that the observed 
geographic peer effects in earnings forecast policies could be due to firms in the same 
geographic area responding to common local shocks rather than peer effects. By defining 
geographic peers as those located in the same MSA but in a different industry, our research 
design rules out the possibility that firms in the same area are responding to local industry 
shocks. Instead, firms could be responding to shocks in local economic conditions. We use an 
instrumental variable strategy to help address this concern and present the results of this 
analysis in Table 4. 
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 A valid instrumental variable must satisfy two conditions (e.g., Larcker and Rusticus, 
2010; Roberts and Whited, 2013). First, the relevance condition requires that the instrument 
is correlated with the fraction of geographic peers providing an earnings forecast after 
controlling for the set of control variables in our main model specification. Second, the 
exclusion restriction requires that, conditioning on the full set of control variables, the 
instrument is correlated with a firm’s propensity to issue an earnings forecast only through 
its correlation with our measure of geographic peer forecast behavior. Based on these criteria, 
we identify two plausibly valid instruments. 
 For our first instrument, we define the variable ,
1
Non Ind Local
t
Expected Forecast  equal to 
the expected fraction of firms operating in the same MSA but in a different industry that 
provide at least one earnings forecast during the fiscal year. To estimate this expectation, we 
first set the likelihood that each firm will provide an earnings forecast (Expected Forecast) to 
the fraction of firms in the same industry but a different MSA that provide at least one 
earnings forecast. We then average Expected Forecast across all firms in the same MSA but 
different industry as the firm of interest. This instrument should meet the relevance 
condition based on our results in Table 3 as well as prior findings which show that the 
disclosure decisions of industry peers affect a firm’s disclosure choice (e.g., Brown et al., 2006; 
Tse and Tucker, 2010). The exclusion restriction for this instrument is that the disclosure 
decisions of firms outside a firm’s industry and MSA should only influence the firm’s 
disclosure choice through the disclosure decisions of its geographic peers. We believe this is 
a reasonable assumption given the lack of observable commonalities between a firm and 
those firms outside its geographic area and industry. 
 For our second instrument, we follow an approach similar to Leary and Roberts (2014) 
and Popadak (2017) and use the idiosyncratic stock return volatility of local non-industry 
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peer firms as an instrument for geographic peer influence. To estimate idiosyncratic 
volatility, we first estimate excess stock returns with the following augmented market model: 
, , , , , , , , , , , ,( ) ( )
MKT MSA
j m t j m t j m t t t j m t j m t t j m tr α β rm rf β r rf η  , (2) 
where rj,m,t refers to the total return for firm j in MSA m over month t, (rmt – rft) is the excess 
market return, and , ,( )j m t tr rf  is the excess return on an equal-weighted MSA portfolio 
excluding firm j’s return. This last factor is intended to remove any variation in returns that 
is common across firms in the same MSA and hence remove local economic shocks. We 
estimate Eq. (2) for each firm on a rolling annual basis using historical monthly return data 
over the prior three years (we require firms to have at least 24 months of returns).  
 Finally, we define each firm’s idiosyncratic volatility as the standard deviation of the 
residuals from the previous regression and use the average idiosyncratic volatility of 
geographic peers as the instrument ( ,
1. .
Non Ind Local
tAvg Idio Risk ). This instrument should meet 
the relevance condition because firms with higher risk, including higher stock return 
volatility, are significantly less likely to issue an earnings forecast (e.g., Nagar et al., 2003). 
Further, because idiosyncratic risk is unpredictable and unique to an individual firm, 
another firm’s idiosyncratic risk should not be directly linked to a manager’s forecast 
decision. Rather, other peers’ idiosyncratic risk works via the impact on their forecast 
decisions, and therefore, this instrument should also meet the exclusion restriction. 
 Table 4 provides the results of two-stage least squares instrumental variable 
regressions that use ,
1
Non Ind Local
tExpectedForecast  and 
,
1. .
Non Ind Local
tAvg Idio Risk  as 
instruments for the fraction of geographic peers issuing forecasts. The first stage results in 
models 1 and 3 show that ,
1
Non Ind Local
tExpectedForecast and 
,
1. .
Non Ind Local
tAvg Idio Risk  are 
significantly related to the forecast choices of geographic peers. The high F-statistics of the 
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instruments’ significance of 921 and 829 imply that the instrumental variables do not suffer 
from the weak instrument problem. Focusing on the second stage results in models 2 and 4, 
we continue to find that a firm’s forecast choice is significantly and positively related to the 
forecast behavior of firms in the same MSA but in a different industry. While we use these 
instruments separately in models 1-4, in models 5 and 6, we include both instruments as 
predictors of the forecast behavior of geographic peers. Similar to the previous models, we 
continue to find geographic peer effects in a firm’s disclosure decision. In addition, the 
instruments are highly significant with a joint F-statistic of 844. Further, based on the 
Hansen J-statistic for overidentification of 0.049 (p-value of 0.82), we are unable to reject the 
null hypothesis that our instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, lending further 
support to the notion that our instruments meet the exclusion restriction. 
 Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that the observed geographic peer effects in a 
firm’s earnings forecast decision are robust to accounting for the possible explanation that 
these effects arise from firms in the same MSA responding to shared local shocks. 
4.3. Why do Geographic Peer Effects in Earnings Forecasts Arise? 
 We next conduct empirical tests to understand why a firm’s choice to issue an earnings 
forecast is sensitive to the forecast behavior of its geographic peers. Specifically, we examine 
whether geographic peer effects in earnings disclosures arise from: i) capital market 
incentives, and/or ii) information sharing among firms. Importantly, these two channels are 
not mutually exclusive, and we may find support for both.  
4.3.1. Capital Market Incentives 
We first test whether geographic peer effects in disclosure choices arise from capital 
market incentives. To the extent that investors recognize and price the availability of 
earnings forecasts when comparing firms in a geographic area, we expect that a firm will face 
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higher costs of non-disclosure when it has a larger base of local investors and a greater 
fraction of its geographic peers issue forecasts. Thus, we predict that the positive relation 
between a firm’s disclosure decision and the disclosure behavior of its geographic peers will 
be stronger when there are more potential investors in the firm’s MSA and when a larger 
share of the firm is owned by investors in its MSA. We examine this prediction in the 
following analysis and report the results in Table 5. 
 We proxy for the presence of local investors by identifying institutional investors 
located in a firm’s MSA.7 We focus on institutional investors because prior work shows that 
firms respond to demands from these investors to provide voluntary disclosures (e.g., Healy 
et al., 1999; Ajinkya et al., 2005). We use five measures to proxy for the presence of local 
institutional investors: i) # of IO is the number of institutional investors located in the same 
MSA as a firm, ii) $ of IO is the total dollar holdings of all institutional investors located in 
the same MSA as a firm, iii) # of Existing IO is the number of institutional investors located 
in the same MSA as a firm that are invested in the firm, iv) $ of Existing IO is the total dollar 
holdings of all institutional investors located in the same MSA as a firm that are invested in 
the firm, and v) Existing % IO is the fraction of a firm’s shares that are owned by institutional 
investors located in the same MSA as the firm. We interact the natural logarithm of the first 
four institutional investor variables and Existing % IO with ,Non Ind Local
t
Forecast
1
 to test our 
prediction. However, we standardize each institutional investor measure to have a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one before interacting them to ease the interpretation of 
coefficient estimates. 
                                                          
7 We thank Gennaro Bernile for sharing this data up to 2010 (e.g., Bernile et al., 2015). We extend the sample to 
2015 by obtaining each institutional investors’ zip code from SEC filings and Bloomberg.com when SEC filings 
are unavailable. We then match each zip code to its corresponding MSA. 
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 The results in Table 5 show that the sensitivity of a firm’s disclosure decision to the 
forecast choices of its geographic peers is stronger when: i) there are more institutional 
investors located in its MSA (model 1), and ii) it is owned by more local institutional investors 
(models 3-5). We do not find that a firm is more likely to issue an earnings forecast when a 
greater fraction of its geographic peers forecast and there is a greater amount of institutional 
holding dollars in the MSA (model 2). In terms of economic significance, the coefficient 
estimate on ,Non Ind LocaltForecast 1  in model 1 implies that, for firms with a mean number of local 
institutional investors in their MSAs, a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of 
geographic peers issuing an earnings forecast increases a firm’s propensity to issue an 
earnings forecast by 2.1 percentage points. However, for firms facing a one standard 
deviation higher number of local institutional investors, a one standard deviation increase in 
the fraction of geographic peers forecasting is associated with an increase in the likelihood 
the firm forecasts of 2.9 (=0.021+0.008) percentage points. The economic magnitudes in 
models 3-5 are similar. 
Next, we test the prediction that, if a greater fraction of geographic peers issue 
forecasts and a firm does not, the firm should experience higher information asymmetry and 
lower investor demand relative to other firms in the MSA who forecast, leading to lower 
liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). We test this prediction using four measures that 
capture the illiquidity of a firm’s stock: i) Illiquidity follows from Amihud (2002) and is the 
absolute value of the daily returns divided by the day’s dollar trading volume averaged over 
the firm’s fiscal year (multiplied by 109), ii) Bid-Ask Spread is the daily closing bid-ask spread 
scaled by the midpoint of the closing bid-ask spread averaged over the firm’s fiscal year, iii) 
$ Trading Vol is the daily dollar trading volume averaged over the firm’s fiscal year, and iv) 
Share Turnover is the daily number of shares traded scaled by the number of shares 
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outstanding averaged over the firm’s fiscal year. Higher values of Illiquid and Bid-Ask 
Spread indicate that a stock is more illiquid, while higher values of $ Trading Vol and Share 
Turnover indicate the stock is less illiquid. To ease the interpretation of coefficient estimates, 
we multiply $ Trading Vol and Share Turnover by minus one so that higher values can be 
interpreted as greater illiquidity. 
 We include in our models our indicator variable for whether a firm issues an earnings 
forecast in year t and interact this indicator variable with our primary variable of interest: 
the fraction of geographic peers that provided at least one earnings forecast in year t-1. Thus, 
the coefficient estimate on ,Non Ind Local
t
Forecast
1
 indicates the effect of geographic peer 
disclosure choices on the stock liquidity of a firm that does not issue a forecast. Importantly, 
the coefficient estimate of interest on the interaction term ,
1
Non Ind Local
t t
Forecast Forecast    
indicates whether a firm can mitigate negative capital market consequences by forecasting 
when a larger fraction of its geographic peers forecast. 
Models 1-4 of Table 6 show that firms that do not forecast have higher illiquidity when 
a larger fraction of their geographic peers forecast. For example, when a firm does not 
forecast, a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of geographic peers forecasting is 
associated with 5.6% higher Illiquidity, an 8.1% higher Bid-Ask Spread, a 5.0% lower $ 
Trading Vol, and 2.9% lower Share Turnover. When the firm also forecasts, however, these 
negative consequences are mitigated but not eliminated (joint F-statistics of 7.09, 36.43, 6.88 
and 3.78, respectively).  
 Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that geographic peer effects in earnings 
forecast decisions are due in part to firms trying to avoid negative capital market effects that 
arise from market pressure from local institutional investors.  
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4.3.2. Information Sharing 
Next, we test whether geographic peer effects in disclosure choices arise from 
information sharing among neighboring firms. Proximity to other firms can increase the 
visibility of firm decisions and facilitate interactions among managers. To the extent that 
direct or indirect interactions with other firms inform a manager’s decision to forecast, 
information sharing could explain why a firm’s forecast decision is sensitive to the forecast 
behavior of its geographic peers.  
We expect that a larger number of geographic peers will facilitate greater 
opportunities for interactions among firms and shorter distances between these peers will 
increase the likelihood that interactions occur. Thus, to examine whether information 
sharing among firms explains our main results, we create three measures that capture these 
opportunities for interactions. First, we follow Karlsson and Manduchi (2001) and Core et al. 
(2016) and use a measure of local firm density (Density) that accounts for both the number of 
geographic peers and the distance between these peers. We calculate Density for firm j in 
year t using the set of peers that are in the same MSA but in a different industry as follows: 
, , , ,
1
, 1
m t n t j n t
N MV Distance
j t n
Density e  , (3) 
where Nm,t is the number of local non-industry firms in MSA m and year t, Distancej,n,t is the 
distance between firms j and n in year t, and MVn,t is the market value of firm n in year t. We 
use the GEODIST function in SAS to calculate the distance between the zip codes of two 
firms. In the case when two firms have the same zip code, we set the distance equal to half 
the minimum distance in the MSA-year. This way, we assume that the two firms are located 
at approximately the radius of the smallest zip code area in the MSA. Higher values of 
Density indicate a larger number of geographic peers (holding distances among these peers 
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constant) or shorter distances among these peers (holding the number of geographic peers 
constant).  
 Our second measure captures only the distance between a firm and its non-industry 
local peers. This measure (VW Distance) is the value-weighted distance between a firm and 
all peers operating in the same MSA but in a different industry, in which weights are based 
on market capitalization. The third measure (# Non-Ind Local Firms) captures the number 
of firms operating in the same MSA but in a different industry. 
 To test whether interactions among firms are a channel through which the observed 
geographic peer effects in forecasting behavior arise, we interact the standardized natural 
logarithm t-1 values of these three measures with our primary variable of interest 
,Non Ind Local
t
Forecast
1
. Table 7 reports the results of this analysis. The results show that, for all 
three measures, the interaction terms are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Thus, 
increases in the number of geographic peers and decreases in distances between these peers 
do not affect the sensitivity of a firm’s disclosure choice to the forecast behavior of its 
geographic peers. Therefore, these results do not support information sharing among firms 
in a geographic area as a channel generating the observed peer effects.  
4.4. Alternative Explanations 
A possible alternative explanation for our findings is that, instead of firms responding 
to the forecasting decisions of their peers, firms and their geographic peers share managers, 
board members, analysts, or institutional investors who influence firm policies according to 
their preferences (Jung, 2013; Cai et al., 2014). We test the extent to which this explanation 
could drive our findings by excluding peers that share these parties with the firm when 
calculating the geographic peer effect portfolios and report the results in Table 8.  
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To identify managers and board members that are shared across firms, we obtain data 
from Boardex. Hence, for our analyses in models 1 and 2, we include only firms and 
geographic peers that we can match to Boardex. In model 1, we exclude geographic peers that 
have a board member who is also CEO of the firm. In model 2, we exclude all geographic 
peers that have a board member who also holds a management or board position at the firm. 
Next, in model 3, we exclude geographic peers that are covered by an analyst who also covers 
the firm. Last, in models 4 and 5, we exclude all peer firms that share an important 
institutional investor with the firm. In model 4, we define important institutional investors 
as those that own at least 5% of the firms’ outstanding shares. In model 5, we broaden the 
definition of important institutional investors to those that own at least 3% of the firms’ 
outstanding shares.  
Overall, across all of the exclusion restrictions, the results continue to show that a 
firm’s forecasting decision is sensitive to the forecasting choices of its geographic peers. Thus, 
these results suggest that our findings are not completely driven by the firm and its 
geographic peers having common managers, board members, analysts, or institutional 
investors. 
5. Additional Robustness Tests 
5.1. Alternative Industry Definitions 
 In all of our tests so far, we group firms into one of nine industries based on SIC code 
divisions. Table 9 shows that the positive relation between the likelihood that a firm provides 
an earnings forecast and the fraction of its non-industry geographic peers that provide 
earnings forecasts is robust to grouping firms using alternative industry classifications. 
Model 1 shows that our results are robust to classifying firms into industries using the 10-K 
text-based industry measure developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016). This measure 
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uses similarities in firm-provided product descriptions to identify a distinct set of competitors 
for each firm and groups firms into 1 of 25 industries. Importantly, unlike traditional 
industry classifications (e.g., by SIC or NAICS), this text-based measure incorporates 
information regarding the degree to which specific firms are similar to their competitors and 
how this changes over time, resulting in a higher likelihood of identifying peers that a firm 
reports as rivals (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016). Models 2-5 show that our results are also robust 
to defining industries by two-digit SIC codes (model 2) as well as Fama-French 12, 17, and 
49 industry classifications (models 3-5). 
5.2. Using Quarterly Forecasts at the Firm-Year-Quarter Level 
 Thus far, the unit of observation in our regressions is at the firm-year level and the 
dependent variable Forecast is set to one if the firm provides at least one quarterly or annual 
earnings forecast during the year. In model 1 of Table 10, we focus our analysis on quarterly 
earnings forecasts and use quarterly data so that the unit of observation is a firm-year-
quarter. We set the indicator variable Forecast to one if the firm issues at least one quarterly 
earnings forecast during the quarter. Consistent with our prior findings, the results show 
that a firm’s propensity to issue a quarterly earnings forecast is positively and statistically 
significantly related to the fraction of geographic peers providing an earnings forecast in the 
prior quarter. 
5.3. Alternative Model Specifications 
A firm’s choice to provide an earnings forecast tends to be a relatively persistent policy 
(e.g., Gibbins et al., 1990). While we include firm fixed effects in our primary tests and thus, 
focus on changes in a firm’s forecast policy, another common approach to account for 
persistency in disclosure policies is to control for a firm’s past disclosure choice (e.g., Brochet 
et al., 2011). In model 2 of Table 10, we control for whether a firm provided an earnings 
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forecast in the prior year and continue to find that the firm’s forecasting decision is sensitive 
to the forecasting decisions of its geographic peers. 
Next, we recognize that an earnings forecast can be qualitative or quantitative and 
take the form of a point, range, or open-ended forecast. We follow prior literature that 
highlights the higher precision and prevalence of point and range forecasts (e.g., Baginski 
and Hassell, 1997; Brochet et al., 2011; Kwak et al., 2012) and identify only those firms that 
issue a point or range forecast as disclosing firms.8 On average, 40% of firm-years in our 
sample provide at least one point or range forecast during the year. Model 3 of Table 10 shows 
that, when exclusively considering point and range forecasts, we continue to find a positive 
and statistically significant relation between the forecast choices of geographic peers and the 
likelihood that a firm forecasts.   
While the dependent variable Forecast is dichotomous, we estimate the likelihood that 
a firm provides an earnings forecast using a linear probability model. There are two criticisms 
generally associated with using linear probability models. First, the standard errors are 
unavoidably heteroskedastic. We correct for this concern by clustering standard errors by 
firm, which accounts for heteroskedasticity. Second, predicted values can lie outside the unit 
interval [0, 1], which could lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. Horrace and Oaxaca 
(2006) show that, if a very small number of predicted values fall outside the unit interval, 
then bias and inconsistency is a minor or nonexistent issue. In our main regression from 
model 4 of Table 3, 4.3% (1,754 out of 40,771 observations) of the predicted values of Forecast 
are outside the unit interval, which is small and therefore any bias should be minimal. 
Nevertheless, Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) suggest excluding any observations with predicted 
values outside the unit interval and re-estimating the models to reduce any potential bias. 
                                                          
8 We follow the classification process in Anilowski et al. (2007) to identify forecasts as point and range forecasts. 
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We apply this approach and report the results in model 4 of Table 10. The results are nearly 
identical to those reported in Table 3.  
An alternative approach is to estimate a conditional logistic regression, which would 
allow us to account for firm fixed effects and include year dummy variables. Model 5 of Table 
10 shows that our main specification from model 3 of Table 3 is robust to estimating a 
conditional logistic regression. We note that the sample size decreases from 40,771 to 24,702 
observations because the conditional logistic model drops firms that either provide a forecast 
every year over the sample period or never provide a forecast over the sample period. We do 
not use the conditional logistic regression for our main analyses for two reasons. First, we 
are unable to include both year and MSA dummy variables, which is our preferred 
specification, in the conditional logistic regression because the models do not converge 
(incidental parameters problem). Second, a number of our tests involve interaction terms. Ai 
and Norton (2003) demonstrate that neither the direction nor the statistical significance of 
the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms in nonlinear models (e.g., conditional 
logistic regressions) are informative. While the authors provide statistical corrections for 
some models, such as logistic and probit regressions, no corrections are available for 
conditional logistic regressions.  
5.4. Management Earnings Forecast Frequency 
 Our main dependent variable Forecast is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm 
provides at least one earnings forecast during the fiscal year. During the year, however, 
managers can frequently update their estimates of future earnings for quarter or annual 
year-ends. In our sample, 43% of firms provide at least one earnings forecast during the year. 
Of these firms, 87% provide more than one forecast and 47% provide at least five forecasts 
during the year. In model 6 of Table 10, we examine the relation between the frequency that 
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a firm provides an earnings forecast and the average forecast frequency of its geographic 
peers. Specifically, we regress the natural logarithm of one plus the number of forecasts a 
firm provides throughout its fiscal year on the average of the natural logarithm of one plus 
the number of forecasts firms in the same MSA but different industry provide during the 
prior fiscal year. The results are similar to our previous findings. A one standard deviation 
increase in the number of earnings forecasts firms in the same geographic area provide is 
associated with a 3.2% increase in the number of earnings forecasts the firm provides.  
5.5. Effect of Excluding Prominent Geographic Areas 
 To ensure that the actions of firms in a single geographic location do not drive our 
results and therefore speak to the generalizability of our findings, we exclude the most 
prominent geographic areas from our sample. In our sample, California, Texas, and New 
York are the three states with the largest concentration of firm headquarters, comprising 
21.4%, 10.0%, and 8.8% of our firm-year observations. Thus, in models 1-3 of Table 11, we 
exclude firms headquartered in these three states in separate regressions, and in model 4, 
we exclude firms headquartered in any of these three states. In models 5 and 6, we exclude 
the largest five and ten MSAs from the regressions, respectively. Overall, the results show 
that the positive relation between a firm’s forecasting decisions and the forecasting decisions 
of its geographic peers is robust to excluding the most concentrated geographic areas from 
our analysis. 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we show that a firm’s decision to provide an earnings forecast is 
sensitive to the disclosure decisions of firms in the same geographic area but in a different 
industry. Further, firms’ disclosure decisions are more sensitive to the disclosure choices of 
geographic peers when there is a larger base of local institutional investors, and firms that 
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do not forecast when a larger fraction of their geographic peers forecast face negative capital 
market effects in the form of lower stock liquidity. Together, these findings imply that 
geographic peer effects in disclosure choices arise in part due to firms trying to avoid negative 
capital market effects induced by market pressure from local institutional investors. In 
addition, we use instrumental variable techniques to help rule out the explanation that these 
geographic peer effects are driven by omitted economic factors unique to a local area that 
lead firms to make similar disclosure decisions. 
We also test two alternative explanations for our findings. First, we examine whether 
these geographic peer effects arise due to firms in the same geographic area sharing 
information. Second, we test whether common decisions arising from firms and their 
geographic peers sharing managers, board members, analysts, or institutional investors who 
have a preference for a particular disclosure policy drive our results. Overall, our findings do 
not suggest that these alternative channels play key roles in generating these geographic 
peer effects.  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables in the regression models. The sample consists of 
firms that have analyst coverage in the IBES database over the 1999 to 2015 period and includes 40,771 firm-
year observations. Continuous variables, except MSA-level economic variables, are winsorized at their 1st and 
99th percentiles, and all dollar values are expressed in 2015 dollars. Variable definitions refer to Compustat 
designations where appropriate. Forecast is an indicator variable that is set to one if a firm issues at least one 
earnings forecast during a fiscal year and zero otherwise. ForecastNon-Ind, Local is the fraction of firms operating 
in the same MSA but in a different industry that provide at least one earnings forecast during the fiscal year. 
ForecastInd is the fraction of firms operating in the same industry that provide at least one earnings forecast 
during the fiscal year (the firm itself is excluded from the calculation of this variable). Firms are grouped into 
nine separate industries based on SIC code divisions. Market Capitalization is a firm’s market value of equity 
(in $ millions) at the end of a fiscal year (prcc_f*csho). Loss Indicator is an indicator variable set to one if income 
before extraordinary items (ib) is less than zero and zero otherwise. Earnings Volatility is the standard 
deviation of quarterly ROA (ibq/atq) over the previous 12 months (we require firms have at least eight 
quarterly observations to enter the sample). Return Volatility is the annualized standard deviation of daily 
returns over a firm’s fiscal year (we require firms have at least 120 daily return observations during their fiscal 
year to enter the sample). Number Analysts is the average number of analysts following a firm over a fiscal 
year. Institutional Ownership is the fraction of shares owned by institutional owners. Book-to-Market is book 
value of equity divided by market value of equity (ceq/(prcc_f*csho)). Industry HHI is the sales-based 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the industry calculated by summing the squares of the ratios of firm sales to 
the industry’s total sales. P.C. Labor Income is the MSA-level per capita amount of labor income. % Change in 
P.C. Labor Income is the percentage change in the MSA-level per capita amount of labor income. # Firms in 
MSA is the number of firms headquartered in a firm’s MSA. 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
Forecast 0.430 0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ForecastNon-Ind, Local 0.396 0.133 0.294 0.400 0.490 
ForecastInd 0.392 0.145 0.311 0.394 0.498 
Market Capitalization 4,824 14,015 217.6 722.3 2,658 
Loss Indicator 0.323 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Earnings Volatility 0.033 0.055 0.006 0.013 0.036 
Return Volatility 0.546 0.312 0.322 0.464 0.685 
Number Analysts 7.415 6.547 2.500 5.250 10.333 
Institutional Ownership 0.574 0.275 0.356 0.614 0.802 
Book-to-Market 0.544 0.463 0.245 0.445 0.722 
Industry HHI 0.022 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.025 
P.C. Labor Income 41,962 8,921 35,838 39,451 45,208 
% Change in P.C. Labor Income 0.010 0.036 -0.009 0.012 0.031 
# Firms in MSA 250.8 230.2 91.00 203.0 282.0 
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Table 2 
Non-Industry Local MSA Portfolio Statistics 
This table lists the 68 MSAs in our sample by the average number of non-industry local firms in each portfolio 
(i.e., ForecastNon-Ind, Local) over the years 1999 to 2015 for each MSA.  
 
 Number of Firms 
Metropolitan Statistical Area Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA  262 58 216 251 293 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA  135 32 110 137 153 
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI  111 31 81 115 126 
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA  107 35 74 105 130 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH  107 42 67 101 135 
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX  103 21 83 98 117 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX  92 22 77 88 101 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD  85 23 67 84 100 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA  83 49 42 66 122 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV  70 15 59 68 77 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI  65 27 43 61 85 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA  63 18 50 59 73 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL  56 21 41 50 70 
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO  52 11 45 48 58 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA  46 13 37 44 54 
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA  35 22 21 26 59 
St. Louis, MO-IL  32 10 22 30 40 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ  31 8 23 31 36 
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI  29 9 24 28 34 
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT  29 11 21 26 34 
Pittsburgh, PA  26 7 19 27 30 
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD  24 7 18 23 29 
Cleveland-Elyria, OH  23 11 12 22 28 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN  23 4 20 22 24 
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA  21 10 11 19 29 
Kansas City, MO-KS  19 5 15 18 23 
Columbus, OH  18 4 15 17 21 
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC  18 3 15 18 20 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL  18 4 15 17 20 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI  18 6 11 18 22 
Richmond, VA  18 4 15 17 20 
Salt Lake City, UT  17 6 13 17 21 
Austin-Round Rock, TX  16 4 13 16 18 
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN  16 5 11 15 21 
Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN  16 5 12 14 19 
Boulder, CO  16 3 12 17 17 
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV  16 3 13 15 17 
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT  15 5 11 13 19 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL  15 3 13 16 18 
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL  14 3 12 14 16 
Rochester, NY  14 3 12 13 17 
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA  14 3 11 14 16 
New Haven-Milford, CT  14 2 13 14 15 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR  13 3 10 13 15 
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Table 2 – (Continued) 
 Number of Firms 
Metropolitan Statistical Area Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
Raleigh, NC  12 2 11 12 14 
Providence-Warwick, RI-MA  12 3 10 11 13 
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN  12 2 11 12 13 
Worcester, MA-CT  12 2 10 11 14 
Santa Maria-Santa Barbara, CA  12 2 10 11 14 
Trenton, NJ  12 2 10 12 13 
Oklahoma City, OK  12 2 11 11 13 
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX  12 2 10 11 12 
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI  12 2 10 12 12 
Jacksonville, FL  11 1 11 11 12 
Tulsa, OK  11 1 10 11 12 
Greensboro-High Point, NC  11 1 10 12 12 
New Orleans-Metairie, LA  11 1 10 11 12 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA  11 1 10 11 12 
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA  11 1 10 10 12 
Dayton, OH  11 1 10 11 11 
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA  11 1 10 11 11 
Akron, OH  10 1 10 10 11 
Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY  10 1 10 10 11 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY  10 0 10 10 10 
Durham-Chapel Hill, NC  10 0 10 10 10 
Greenville-Anderson-Mauldin, SC  10 0 10 10 10 
Manchester-Nashua, NH  10 0 10 10 10 
Lafayette, LA  10 NA 10 10 10 
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Table 3 
Geographic Peer Effects in Management Earnings Forecasts 
This table reports the results from linear probability models relating the likelihood that a firm provides an 
earnings forecast to the proportion of local non-industry peers that provide earnings forecasts for firms from 
1999 to 2015. The dependent variable Forecast in models 1-4 is an indicator variable that is set to one if a firm 
issues at least one earnings forecast during a fiscal year and zero otherwise. ForecastNon-Ind, Local equals the 
fraction of firms operating in the same MSA but in a different industry that provide at least one earnings 
forecast during the fiscal year. Table 1 provides definitions of all other variables. All continuous variables have 
been standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to ease the interpretation of coefficient 
estimates. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 Dependent Variable = Forecast(t) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.018***  
(4.32) (3.54) (3.86) (3.55) 
ForecastInd(t-1) 0.146*** 0.149*** 0.074*** 0.077***  
(23.97) (24.62) (7.18) (7.95) 
Ln(Market Capitalization)(t-1)  0.025***  0.134***  
 (3.09)  (13.10) 
Loss Indicator(t)  -0.124***  -0.037***  
 (-14.93)  (-5.40) 
Earnings Volatility(t)  -0.017***  -0.012***  
 (-5.42)  (-3.32) 
Return Volatility(t)  -0.008*  -0.015***  
 (-1.92)  (-3.45) 
Ln(Number Analysts)(t-1)  0.095***  0.048***  
 (14.89)  (8.05) 
Institutional Ownership(t-1)  0.058***  0.011*  
 (10.11)  (1.72) 
Book-to-Market(t-1)  0.004  0.008*  
 (1.01)  (1.79) 
Industry HHI(t-1)  -0.007  -0.010  
 (-1.45)  (-1.23) 
Ln(P.C. Labor Income)(t-1)  0.015***  0.062***  
 (2.71) 
 
(3.73) 
% Change in P.C. Labor Income(t)  0.002  0.005  
 (0.64) (1.53) 
Ln(# Firms in MSA)(t-1)  -0.015***  -0.007  
 (-2.88) (-0.19) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 40,771 40,771 40,771 40,771 
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.220 0.533 0.552 
37 
 
Table 4 
Instrumental Variables Analysis 
This table reports results from two-stage least squares regressions relating the likelihood that a firm provides an earnings forecast to the proportion of 
local non-industry peers that provide earnings forecasts for firms from 1999 to 2015. Forecast is an indicator variable that is set to one if a firm issues at 
least one earnings forecast during a fiscal year and zero otherwise. ForecastNon-Ind, Local equals the fraction of firms operating in the same MSA but in a 
different industry that provide at least one earnings forecast during the fiscal year. In the first stage regressions (models 1, 3, and 5), we regress ForecastNon-
Ind, Local on the instrumental variables and controls. The instrument Expected ForecastNon-Ind, Local equals the expected fraction of firms operating in the same 
MSA but in a different industry that provide at least one earnings forecast during the fiscal year. To estimate this expectation, we first set the likelihood 
that each firm will provide an earnings forecast (Expected Forecast) to the fraction of firms in the same industry but different MSA that provide at least 
one earnings forecast. We then average Expected Forecast across all firms in the same MSA but different industry as the firm of interest. The instrument 
Avg. Idio. RiskNon-Ind, Local equals the equal-weighted average idiosyncratic stock return volatility of firms operating in the same MSA but in a different 
industry. To estimate each firm’s idiosyncratic return volatility, we first regress each firm’s monthly stock returns on market returns in excess of the risk-
free rate and the returns of an equal-weighted MSA-level portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate. The regression is estimated for each firm on a rolling 
annual basis using historical monthly returns data over the prior three years (we require firms to have at least 24 months of returns). We then define each 
firm’s idiosyncratic risk as the standard deviation of the residuals from this regression. In the second stage regressions (models 2, 4, and 6), we regress 
Forecast on the fitted values of ForecastNon-Ind, Local from models 1, 3, or 5. Control variables include Ln(Market Capitalization)(t-1), Loss Indicator(t), Earnings 
Volatility(t), Return Volatility(t), Ln(Number Analysts)(t-1), Institutional Ownership(t-1), Book-to-Market(t-1), Industry HHI(t-1), Ln(P.C. Labor Income)(t-1), % 
Change in P.C. Labor Income(t), and Ln(# Firms in MSA)(t-1). Table 1 provides definitions of all other variables. All continuous variables have been 
standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to ease the interpretation of coefficient estimates. t-statistics in parentheses are 
calculated from standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
ForecastNon-Ind, 
Local
(t-1) 
Forecast(t) 
ForecastNon-Ind, 
Local
(t-1) 
Forecast(t) 
ForecastNon-Ind, 
Local
(t-1) 
Forecast(t) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Expected ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) 0.724***    0.681***   
(30.34)   (29.39)  
Avg. Idio. RiskNon-Ind, Local(t-1)   -0.384***  -0.372***   
(-28.80)  (-30.05)  
Fitted ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1)  0.064***  0.074***  0.071***  
(3.15)  (3.25)  (4.38) 
ForecastInd(t-1) 0.031** 0.086*** -0.162*** 0.087*** 0.042*** 0.087*** 
 (2.11) (8.21) (-10.80) (8.27) (2.85) (8.38) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 39,445 39,445 36,881 36,881 36,881 36,881 
Adjusted R2 0.766 0.551 0.764 0.564 0.782 0.564 
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Table 5 
Effect of Local Institutional Investors 
This table reports the results from linear probability models relating the likelihood that a firm provides an 
earnings forecast to the proportion of local non-industry peers that provide earnings forecasts for firms from 
1999 to 2015. The dependent variable Forecast in models 1-5 is an indicator variable that is set to one if a firm 
issues at least one earnings forecast during a fiscal year and zero otherwise. ForecastNon-Ind, Local equals the 
fraction of firms operating in the same MSA but in a different industry that provide at least one earnings 
forecast during the fiscal year. # of IO is the number of institutional investors located in the same MSA as a 
firm. $ of IO is the total dollar holdings of all institutional investors located in the same MSA as a firm. # of 
Existing IO is the number of institutional investors located in the same MSA as a firm that are invested in the 
firm. $ of Existing IO is the total dollar holdings of all institutional investors located in the same MSA as a firm 
that are invested in the firm. Existing % IO is the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors located in 
the same MSA as the firm. Control variables include Ln(Market Capitalization)(t-1), Loss Indicator(t), Earnings 
Volatility(t), Return Volatility(t), Ln(Number Analysts)(t-1), Institutional Ownership(t-1), Book-to-Market(t-1), 
Industry HHI(t-1), Ln(P.C. Labor Income)(t-1), % Change in P.C. Labor Income(t), and Ln(# Firms in MSA)(t-1). 
Model 3 also controls for the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of institutional investors that are 
invested in the firm. Model 4 also controls for the natural logarithm of one plus the total dollar holdings of 
institutional investors that are invested in the firm. Table 1 provides definitions of all other variables. All 
continuous variables have been standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to ease 
the interpretation of coefficient estimates. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from standard errors 
clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 Dependent Variable = Forecast(t) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020***  
(3.96) (3.75) (3.85) (3.78) (3.84) 
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) × Ln(# of IO + 1)(t-1) 0.008**      
(2.17)     
Ln(# of IO + 1)(t-1) -0.059**      
(-1.98)     
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) × Ln($ of IO + 1)(t-1)  0.004     
 (1.26)    
Ln($ of IO + 1)(t-1)  0.014     
 (0.68)    
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) × Ln(# of Existing IO + 1)(t-1)   0.007**    
  (2.10)   
Ln(# of Existing IO + 1)(t-1)   0.012    
  (1.18)   
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) × Ln($ of Existing IO + 1)(t-1)    0.007**   
   (2.23)  
Ln($ of Existing IO + 1)(t-1)    -0.001   
   (-0.16)  
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) × Existing % IO(t-1)     0.007*  
    (1.87) 
Existing % IO(t-1)     -0.003  
    (-0.44) 
ForecastInd(t-1) 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
 (8.00) (7.96) (8.04) (8.03) (8.00) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 40,771 40,771 40,771 40,771 40,771 
Adjusted R2 0.552 0.552 0.552 0.552 0.552 
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Table 6 
Geographic Peer Effects and Capital Market Consequences 
This table reports the results from OLS regressions relating measures of a firm’s stock liquidity to the 
proportion of local non-industry peers that provide an earnings forecast for firms from 1999 to 2015. The 
dependent variables in models 1-4 capture the illiquidity of a firm’s stock and are defined as follows: Illiquidity 
follows Amihud (2002) and is defined as AvgIlliq×109, where AvgIlliq is the absolute value of daily returns 
divided by the day’s dollar trading volume averaged over the firm’s fiscal year; Bid-Ask Spread is the daily 
closing bid-ask spread scaled by the midpoint of the closing bid-ask spread averaged over the firm’s fiscal year; 
$ Trading Vol is the daily dollar trading volume averaged over the firm’s fiscal year; Share Turnover is the 
daily number of shares traded scaled by the number of shares outstanding averaged over the firm’s fiscal year. 
Forecast is an indicator variable that is set to one if a firm issues at least one earnings forecast during a fiscal 
year and zero otherwise. ForecastNon-Ind, Local equals the fraction of firms operating in the same MSA but in a 
different industry that provide at least one earnings forecast during the fiscal year. Table 1 provides definitions 
of all other variables. All continuous control variables have been standardized to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one to ease the interpretation of coefficient estimates. t-statistics in parentheses are 
calculated from standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
Ln(Illiquidity)(t) 
Ln(Bid-Ask 
Spread)(t) 
–1×Ln($ 
Trading Vol)(t) 
–1×Ln(Share 
Turnover)(t) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) 0.056*** 0.081*** 0.050*** 0.029***  
(5.02) (8.12) (4.99) (3.73) 
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) × Forecast(t) -0.029*** -0.019** -0.026*** -0.015**  
(-2.87) (-2.09) (-2.81) (-2.14) 
Forecast(t) -0.059*** -0.019 -0.052*** -0.048***  
(-4.25) (-1.57) (-4.06) (-5.03) 
ForecastInd(t-1) 0.053*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.054***  
(3.14) (4.43) (4.83) (4.45) 
Ln(Market Capitalization)(t-1) -2.060*** -0.895*** -1.728*** -0.299***  
(-95.45) (-44.23) (-89.73) (-19.05) 
Loss Indicator(t) 0.323*** 0.153*** 0.328*** 0.108***  
(21.66) (14.84) (23.98) (10.70) 
Earnings Volatility(t) 0.036*** 0.016** 0.019** 0.006  
(4.03) (2.49) (2.41) (1.06) 
Return Volatility(t) 0.202*** 0.079*** -0.317*** -0.375***  
(18.40) (9.89) (-30.38) (-51.02) 
Ln(Number Analysts)(t-1) -0.099*** -0.001 -0.038*** -0.044***  
(-8.31) (-0.13) (-3.38) (-4.79) 
Institutional Ownership(t-1) -0.214*** -0.044*** -0.141*** -0.185***  
(-16.07) (-4.04) (-11.93) (-18.61) 
Book-to-Market(t-1) 0.028*** -0.004 0.031*** 0.066***  
(2.94) (-0.58) (3.70) (9.44) 
Industry HHI(t-1) -0.028** -0.044*** -0.017 -0.021**  
(-2.17) (-3.69) (-1.44) (-2.17) 
Ln(P.C. Labor Income)(t-1) 0.009 0.025 0.049* 0.058**  
(0.32) (0.83) (1.79) (2.56) 
% Change in P.C. Labor Income(t) -0.045*** -0.010** -0.037*** -0.012***  
(-7.43) (-2.17) (-6.46) (-2.86) 
Ln(# Firms in MSA)(t-1) 0.087 -0.065 0.034 -0.036  
(1.20) (-0.92) (0.53) (-0.68) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 40,771 40,771 40,771 40,771 
Adjusted R2 0.947 0.895 0.928 0.732 
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Table 7 
Effect of the Local Firm Density 
This table reports the results from linear probability models relating the likelihood that a firm provides an 
earnings forecast to the proportion of local non-industry peers that provide earnings forecasts for firms from 
1999 to 2015. The dependent variable Forecast in models 1-3 is an indicator variable that is set to one if a firm 
issues at least one earnings forecast during a fiscal year and zero otherwise. ForecastNon-Ind, Local equals the 
fraction of firms operating in the same MSA but in a different industry that provide at least one earnings 
forecast during the fiscal year. Density is the measure of non-industry local firm density defined in Section 
4.3.2. Eq. (3). VW Distance is the value-weighted distance of all firms operating in the same MSA but in a 
different industry, in which weights are based on market capitalization. # Non-Ind Local Firms is the number 
of firms operating in the same MSA but in a different industry. Control variables include Ln(Market 
Capitalization)(t-1), Loss Indicator(t), Earnings Volatility(t), Return Volatility(t), Ln(Number Analysts)(t-1), 
Institutional Ownership(t-1), Book-to-Market(t-1), Industry HHI(t-1), Ln(P.C. Labor Income)(t-1), % Change in P.C. 
Labor Income(t), and Ln(# Firms in MSA)(t-1). Table 1 provides definitions of all other variables. All continuous 
variables have been standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to ease the 
interpretation of coefficient estimates. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from standard errors clustered 
by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 Dependent Variable = Forecast(t) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019***  
(3.68) (3.59) (3.26) 
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) ×  Ln(Density)(t-1) 0.001    
(0.57)  
Ln(Density)(t-1) -0.007**    
(-2.06)  
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) ×  Ln(VW Distance)(t-1)  0.001   
(0.18)  
Ln(VW Distance)(t-1)  0.001   
(0.14)  
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) ×  Ln(# Non-Ind Local Firms)(t-1)   0.004  
(1.25) 
Ln(# Non-Ind Local Firms)(t-1)   -0.041 
   (-1.59) 
ForecastInd(t-1) 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.079***  
(7.96) (7.96) (8.15) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 40,771 40,771 40,771 
Adjusted R2 0.550 0.552 0.552 
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Table 8 
Effect of Shared Managers, Board Members, Analysts, and Institutional Investors 
This table reports the results from linear probability models relating the likelihood that a firm provides an earnings 
forecast to the proportion of local non-industry peers that provide earnings forecasts for firms from 1999 to 2015. The 
dependent variable Forecast in models 1-5 is an indicator variable that is set to one if a firm issues at least one earnings 
forecast during a fiscal year and zero otherwise. ForecastNon-Ind, Local equals the fraction of firms operating in the same 
MSA but in a different industry that provide at least one earnings forecast during the fiscal year. In models 1 and 2, 
the sample of firms and geographic peer firms is restricted to those firms that can be matched to the Boardex database. 
In model 1, ForecastNon-Ind, Local is calculated after excluding geographic peers that have a board member who is also 
CEO of the firm. In model 2, ForecastNon-Ind, Local is calculated after excluding geographic peers that have a board 
member who also holds a management or board position at the firm. In model 3, ForecastNon-Ind, Local is calculated after 
excluding geographic peers that are covered by an analyst who also covers the firm. In models 4 and 5, ForecastNon-Ind, 
Local is calculated after excluding geographic peers in which an important institutional investor in the firm is also an 
important institutional investor of the peer firm. Important institutional investors are those that own at least 5% or 
3% of the firms’ outstanding shares in models 4 and 5, respectively. Control variables include Ln(Market 
Capitalization)(t-1), Loss Indicator(t), Earnings Volatility(t), Return Volatility(t), Ln(Number Analysts)(t-1), Institutional 
Ownership(t-1), Book-to-Market(t-1), Industry HHI(t-1), Ln(P.C. Labor Income)(t-1), % Change in P.C. Labor Income(t), and 
Ln(# Firms in MSA)(t-1). Table 1 provides definitions of all other variables. All continuous variables have been 
standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to ease the interpretation of coefficient estimates. 
t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 Dependent Variable = Forecast(t) 
 
Drop Shared 
CEO 
Drop Shared 
Manager or 
Board Member 
Drop Shared 
Analyst 
Drop Shared IO 
– 5% 
Drop Shared IO 
– 3% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) 0.012** 0.011** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 
 (2.31) (2.09) (2.79) (3.24) (2.96) 
ForecastInd(t-1) 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 
 (4.79) (4.74) (7.96) (8.07) (8.01) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 28,105 28,885 39,848 39,284 39,284 
Adjusted R2 0.669 0.669 0.554 0.556 0.556 
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Table 9 
Robustness: Alternative Industry Definitions 
This table reports the results from linear probability models relating the likelihood that a firm provides an earnings 
forecast to the proportion of local non-industry peers that provide earnings forecasts for firms from 1999 to 2015. The 
dependent variable Forecast in models 1-5 is an indicator variable that is set to one if a firm issues at least one earnings 
forecast during a fiscal year and zero otherwise. ForecastNon-Ind, Local equals the fraction of firms operating in the same 
MSA but in a different industry that provide at least one earnings forecast during the fiscal year. In model 1, firms 
are grouped into 25 separate industries using the 10-K text-based fixed industry classifications from Hoberg and 
Phillips (2010, 2016). In model 2, industries are defined by two-digit SIC codes. In models 3-5, industries are defined 
by the Fama-French 12, 17, and 49 industry classifications, respectively. For each industry classification, we require 
that both portfolios ForecastNon-Ind, Local and ForecastInd be calculated using at least 10 firms, resulting in different 
sample sizes from our main tests and across the specifications. Control variables include Ln(Market Capitalization)(t-
1), Loss Indicator(t), Earnings Volatility(t), Return Volatility(t), Ln(Number Analysts)(t-1), Institutional Ownership(t-1), 
Book-to-Market(t-1), Industry HHI(t-1), Ln(P.C. Labor Income)(t-1), % Change in P.C. Labor Income(t), and Ln(# Firms in 
MSA)(t-1). Table 1 provides definitions of all other variables. All continuous variables have been standardized to have 
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to ease the interpretation of coefficient estimates. t-statistics in 
parentheses are calculated from standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 Dependent Variable = Forecast(t) 
 HP25 SIC2 FF12 FF17 FF49 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017***  
(3.00) (3.48) (3.23) (3.15) (3.24) 
ForecastInd(t-1) 0.056*** 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.084*** 
 (9.26) (11.97) (8.49) (8.99) (11.17) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41,160 40,880 41,506 41,033 41,015 
Adjusted R2 0.548 0.553 0.550 0.553 0.551 
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Table 10 
Robustness: Data Frequency and Model Specification 
This table reports the results from models relating the likelihood that a firm provides an earnings forecast to the 
proportion of local non-industry peers that provide earnings forecasts for firms from 1999 to 2015. The dependent 
variable Forecast in models 1-5 is an indicator variable that is set to one if a firm issues at least one earnings forecast 
during a fiscal year (or quarter) and zero otherwise. Model 1 estimates a linear probability model using quarterly data, 
and ForecastNon-Ind, Local equals the fraction of firms operating in the same MSA but in a different industry that provide 
at least one earnings forecast during the fiscal quarter. For this test, we limit our sample to quarterly forecasts, and 
variables in t-1 are measured in the prior quarter. Models 2-5 use annual data, and ForecastNon-Ind, Local equals the 
fraction of firms operating in the same MSA but in a different industry that provide at least one earnings forecast 
during the fiscal year. Model 2 controls for Forecast in year t-1. Model 3 includes only point and range earnings 
forecasts. In model 4, we first determine the predicted values of Forecast by estimating model 4 of Table 3. Next, we 
re-estimate this regression after dropping any observation in which the predicted value of Forecast is outside the [0, 
1] interval. Model 5 estimates a conditional logistic regression. The sample size decreases from 40,771 to 24,702 
observations because the conditional logistic model drops firms that either provide a forecast every year over the 
sample period or never provide a forecast over the sample period. Model 6 uses our main sample from model 4 of Table 
3 and reports the results from an OLS regression relating the frequency that a firm provides an earnings forecast to 
the average forecast frequency of local non-industry peers. The dependent variable Ln(Freq+1) is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of earnings forecasts a firm provides during a fiscal year. Ln(Freq+1)Non-Ind, Local is 
the average of the natural logarithm of one plus the number of earnings forecasts made by firms operating in the same 
MSA but in a different industry during a fiscal year. Ln(Freq+1)Ind is the average of the natural logarithm of one plus 
the number of earnings forecasts made by firms in the same industry (the firm itself is excluded from the calculation). 
Control variables include Ln(Market Capitalization)(t-1), Loss Indicator(t), Earnings Volatility(t), Return Volatility(t), 
Ln(Number Analysts)(t-1), Institutional Ownership(t-1), Book-to-Market(t-1), Industry HHI(t-1), Ln(P.C. Labor Income)(t-1), 
% Change in P.C. Labor Income(t), and Ln(# Firms in MSA)(t-1). Table 1 provides definitions of all other variables. All 
continuous variables have been standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to ease the 
interpretation of coefficient estimates. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from standard errors clustered by 
firm. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 Dependent Variable = Forecast(t) Ln(Freq +1)(t) 
 
Quarterly 
Data 
Lagged Dep. 
Var. 
Point and 
Range 
Trimmed 
Conditional 
Logistic 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) 0.009** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.163***   
(2.44) (3.39) (3.84) (3.33) (3.74)  
ForecastInd(t-1) 0.069*** 0.051*** 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.552***  
 (11.42) (6.41) (7.99) (7.77) (7.07)  
Forecast(t-1)  0.259***     
  (31.92)     
Ln(Freq + 1)Non-Ind, Local(t-1)      0.032***  
     (2.89) 
Ln(Freq + 1)Ind(t-1)      0.186*** 
      (10.47) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Observations 153,045 40,420 40,771 39,017 24,702 40,771 
Adjusted R2 (Wald χ2)  0.471 0.586 0.561 0.548 (932.6) 0.610 
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Table 11 
Effect of Excluding Prominent Geographic Areas 
This table reports the results from linear probability models relating the likelihood that a firm provides an earnings 
forecast to the proportion of local non-industry peers that provide earnings forecasts for firms from 1999 to 2015. The 
dependent variable Forecast in models 1-6 is an indicator variable that is set to one if a firm issues at least one earnings 
forecast during a fiscal year and zero otherwise. ForecastNon-Ind, Local equals the fraction of firms operating in the same 
MSA but in a different industry that provide at least one earnings forecast during the fiscal year. Models 1-3 exclude 
any firm headquartered in California, Texas, and New York, respectively. Model 4 excludes any firm headquartered 
in either California, Texas, or New York. Models 5 and 6 exclude any firm headquartered in one of the five or ten 
largest MSAs (based on the number of firms in our sample headquartered in the MSAs). Control variables include 
Ln(Market Capitalization)(t-1), Loss Indicator(t), Earnings Volatility(t), Return Volatility(t), Ln(Number Analysts)(t-1), 
Institutional Ownership(t-1), Book-to-Market(t-1), Industry HHI(t-1), Ln(P.C. Labor Income)(t-1), % Change in P.C. Labor 
Income(t), and Ln(# Firms in MSA)(t-1). Table 1 provides definitions of all other variables. All continuous variables have 
been standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to ease the interpretation of coefficient 
estimates. t-statistics in parentheses are calculated from standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 Dependent Variable = Forecast(t) 
 Drop CA Drop TX Drop NY 
Drop CA, 
TX, NY  
Drop 5 
Largest 
MSAs 
Drop 10 
Largest 
MSAs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ForecastNon-Ind, Local(t-1) 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.013** 0.016***  
(2.79) (3.51) (3.56) (2.78) (2.41) (2.71) 
ForecastInd(t-1) 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.078*** 0.060*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 
 (6.94) (6.33) (7.69) (4.69) (6.41) (4.99) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32,031 36,676 37,188 24,353 25,476 16,539 
Adjusted R2 0.557 0.553 0.549 0.555 0.550 0.544 
 
